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ABSTRACT 
In May 2009, the European Commission released a draft consultation document on the 
application of state aid rules to broadband network deployment, leaving open the possibility 
of significant state aid intervention.  However, this paper argues that this cannot occur due to 
the overarching nature and essential features of the EU’s by now well embedded 
telecommunications policy apparatus, as well as its legal remit in telecommunications. 
Specifically, EU telecommunications policy, normatively and practically, is devised through 
a neo-liberal policy lens.  The paper attempts to show, using state aid to Next Generation 
Access networks as the example, that this dominant policy perspective not only de-limits the 
extent of state intervention for public policy reasons, but it also fundamentally shapes the 
character of such intervention which does occur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of its 1987 Green Paper on the establishment of the Single European 
Market in telecommunications, EU telecommunications policy has developed 
overwhelmingly along market lines. Policy energies have been concentrated on the 
replacement of the old, nationally idiosyncratic, state-run monopolistic systems with a 
differentiated, competitively ordered, series of markets of significantly homogenous character 
across EU members. The consequent elaborate policy apparatus developed as a system of 
regulatory governance at national and EU level aimed almost exclusively at the opening of 
markets and the cultivation of competition therein. The use of interventionist non-market 
based public policy levers has been modest, manifest for the most part in measures for the 
maintenance of universal service obligations.  
However, recent EU policy developments in the area of very high speed broadband - or next 
generation  - networks (NGNs) suggests, on the surface, evidence for the potential to develop 
a significant change of approach.  This paper explores the reasons behind the possibilities for 
such a potential shift, and speculates on its likely materialisation. The creation of NGNs - and 
in particular the upgrading of the local part of telecommunications network to create what are 
known as next generation access (NGA) networks -  is seen by the EU as being an essential 
driver of economic and social progress in the coming decades.  The desire to create such 
infrastructural development has been heightened by the severity and likely longevity of the 
current economic downturn. The European Commission recently put forward ‘A European 
Economic Recovery Plan’ urging significant public sector investment in ten core areas one of 
which is broadband infrastructures (European Commission 2008a). Beyond this, concerns 
exist about the extent to which the regulated market competition in telecommunications, 
fashioned since the mid 1980s, can deliver effective investment in network upgrades within 
appropriate timescales, even if it is functioning appropriately in competition policy terms.  
In May 2009, the Commission released a draft consultation document – followed by a 
finalised set of guidelines in September (European Commission 2009a)  - on the application 
of state aid rules to broadband network deployment, leaving open the possibility for 
significant public sector intervention (European Commission 2009b).  However, the core 
argument of the paper is that the nature and essential features of its now well embedded 
telecommunications policy apparatus, as well as the EU’s legal remit in telecommunications, 
militate strongly against such a move, even if the Commission’s desire to see it occur is more 
than rhetorical. This is the case because EU telecommunications policy, normatively and 
practically, is devised through a neo-liberal policy lens.  The paper attempts to show, using 
state aid to NGAs as the example, that this dominant policy perspective not only de-limits the 
extent of state intervention for public policy reasons, but it also fundamentally shapes the 
character of such intervention which does occur. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly outlines the neo-liberal character of 
EU telecommunications policy, thereafter providing some basic coverage of the main features 
of the growth of broadband communications across the EU. The subsequent sections of the 
paper turn to the EU’s recent consideration of the role of state aid in broadband development, 
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moving in the process to an analysis of the European Commission’s policy on NGNs and 
specifically next generation access (NGA) networks. The final two sections of the paper 
attempt briefly to contextualise the recent policy activity of the EU on state aid to NGA 
networks in the core arguments of the paper. 
 
THE NEO-LIBERAL CHARACTER OF EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AID  
Historically, the state in the EU played a very important role in telecommunications, a series 
of state-owned monopoly Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) companies being 
responsible for the provision of basic telephony services to citizens. Telecommunications 
across much of Europe was state owned, state-funded, state-operated and state-led (Grande 
1984). Since approximately the beginning of the 1980s, however, the state gradually and 
systematically withdrew itself from these key roles in telecommunications. The monopoly 
service provider was at least partly, and often completely, privatised. The governance of the 
sector’s functioning and evolution were placed in the hands of a series of new independent, 
national regulatory authorities (Thatcher 1999). Both telecommunications infrastructures and 
services old and new were structured along (often not very) competitive lines, the regulatory 
parameters of which were the responsibility these NRAs to police. Very importantly, as the 
latter part of the 1980s proceeded, the EU began to play an important role in setting a broad 
common regulatory framework for the newly evolving telecommunications sectors of its 
Member States (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). This involved agreement on, and 
implementation of, a battery of EU legislation of a liberalising and harmonising kind which 
has evolved through successive phases of refinement (see Goodman 2006). The current EU 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework is the most recent version of this process, 
epitomising the classic transition of telecommunications in the EU from corporate to the 
regulatory state (see Seidman and Gilmour 1986; Majone 1996) and cementing further the 
significance of the EU in the governance landscape of European telecommunications 
(Simpson 2009).  
A key concern of the (neo) liberalising agenda of telecommunications across the EU has been 
to ensure that markets develop and function free from the distortions to competition which 
can occur through what is viewed as unjustifiable state influence. This has manifest itself in a 
number of ways in telecommunications. A major issue has been the independence of the 
NRA from the state. Another has been the degree of possible state ownership of, and 
influence in, the daily affairs of telecommunications incumbent (ex-PTT) operators, though 
the EU has not gone as far as to mandate the (partial) privatisation of  PTTs. Much less high 
profile has been the general powers held by the EU to take action against state aid provision 
made in respect of one or more telecommunications firms. Over the last 20 or so years, this 
has not been a controversial aspect of the development of an often fractious 
telecommunications policy package at EU level. Two likely reasons lie behind this. First, the 
acceptance of the neo-liberal policy agenda has been more or less widespread and universal 
across EU Member States in telecommunications. Though the European Commission has 
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taken great pains to highlight any exceptions, on the whole the state has willingly and 
relatively obediently withdrawn from operational and regulatory functions in 
telecommunications. Second, whilst the development of EU telecommunications legislation 
has been overwhelmingly market liberalising and harmonising in character, a significant 
aspect of successive regulatory packages has been the provision made for basic universal 
service elements in telecommunications. The issue of universal service, and in particular the 
extent to which the basic defined level should rise as technological and service sophistication 
proceeds, does, however, tie in with the possible kinds of role which the state might play 
even in and out-and-out neo-liberal telecommunications sector.  Here, the role of economic 
development and relative social equity within specific state jurisdictions is raised. Beyond 
these matters of ‘safety net’ telecommunications policy, the efficacy of the neo-liberal 
telecommunications model in delviering appropriate levels of electronic communications 
networks and services is also an important issue, the key corollary being that the only likely 
source of resources necessary to rectify any deficiencies in the neo-liberal market mechanism 
is likely to be the state. 
An until now under-addressed matter in the study of the evolving EU telecommunications has 
been the extent to which state involvement, in terms of resource allocation to the sector, has 
continued in spite of the move towards a regulated liberal market economy in 
telecommunications. Such an analysis draws in the well-developed general powers which the 
EU is able to exercise to address state aid measures which might be potentially distortive of 
competition in the Single European Market and the extent to which these have been applied 
to the telecommunications sector. As this paper will go on to illustrate, despite the EU having 
been fairly active in decision taking regarding state aid measures notified to it in respect of 
telecommunications, it is only recently that it has begun, through the European Commission, 
to articulate the parameters of a clear policy on state aid to the infrastructural aspects of 
telecommunications. The key issue here appears to have been the extent to which state aid 
intervention has been permitted by the EU in the relative ‘leading edge’ infrastructural 
aspects of electronic communications network evolution, in respect of broadband technology. 
The EU has also recently concerned itself with future infrastructural (and related service 
based) contexts in the shape of so-called next generation access networks (NGAs). The 
potentially controversial debate on the role of state aid here has been sharpened by the recent 
global economic crisis which has raised considerable doubt about the long term stability and 
efficacy of the global neo-liberal model of regulated capitalism, not least because of the 
dramatic and substantial direct intervention by the state to save it from outright collapse. 
Before exploring in some detail the recent approach which the EU has taken to developing a 
policy on state aid to broadband and NGA infrastructures, the next section of the paper 
provides some context on the evolution of broadband networks and services across the EU. 
 
 
 
 6 
THE STATE OF BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IN THE EU – OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES  
Fixed network broadband communications have become increasingly prevalent across the EU 
in the last decade. However, the average fixed network broadband penetration rate, measured 
as the number of broadband lines per 100 of the population is still only 21.7%1
This level of incumbent domination in the broadband market led the Commission in 2008 to 
launch a consultation on future regulatory principles to be applied to next generation access 
networks (NGAs) based on a draft Recommendation. Highlighting the seriousness with 
which it viewed the development of NGAs, the Commission noted that whilst ‘a number of 
operators, both incumbent and ‘alternative’, have launched large scale roll-outs of new 
broadband infrastructure…Europe appears to be still lagging behind other economies, notably 
the United States and Japan’ (European Commission 2008c: 2). The Commission’s approach 
to NGA access has at its basis the desire to ensure EU-wide lowest cost, most flexible levels 
of access based on the belief that this will incentivise competitive entry into the market 
ensuring timely, low cost, high quality roll out of new networks and (by association) new 
services. The Information Society Commissioner, Viviane Reding, expressed the concern that 
‘uncoordinated or even contradictory action of national regulators as regards Next Generation 
Networks could seriously damage competition and undermine Europe’s single market’ 
(European Commission 2008b: 1).  However, concerns over the ability of the EU to invest 
adequately enough, and according to an appropriate timescale, in broadband has focused 
attention on the possible role of state aid in the development of NGAs. 
 (European 
Commission 2008a: 6). In terms of download speeds, a key issue in current and next 
generation services, merely 12.8% of broadband lines deliver speeds beyond 10Mbps.  Since 
2006, growth in the number of new broadband lines installed across the EU has fallen. As 
might be expected, broadband lines exist in greatest number in the most populous and 
strongest of the EU’s economies: Germany (20.1%), the UK (15.5%), France (15.4%) and 
Italy (10%) (European Commission 2008a: 10). The fixed broadband line market shows less 
evidence of incumbent domination that traditional fixed link networks. However, in 2008, on 
average across the EU, incumbents still accounted for 45.6% of fixed broadband access lines, 
which rose to 52.1% if resale lines in the ownership of these companies is taken into account. 
Whilst this figure has been falling since 2003 (from 58.7%), evidence suggests that the rate of 
market share reduction has been flattening out since 2005. Though the percentage of digital 
subscriber lines (DSL) provided by incumbents has fallen from 77.9% in 2003 to 55.9% in 
2008, the rate has barely decreased since 2006. Incumbent fixed broadband access lines 
domination varied across the EU from 22% to 83% in 2008(European Commission 2008a: 
13-14).  
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THE EU’S INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AID TO ‘TRADITIONAL’ BROADBAND 
NETWORK DEVELOPMENT  
The Commission’s State Aid Action Plan (European Commission 2005) has highlighted the 
role which state aid intervention can play in eradicating market failures and improving the 
functioning of markets and competitiveness. The Commission has also more recently claimed 
that ‘where markets provide efficient outcomes but these are deemed unsatisfactory from a 
societal point of view, state aid may be used to obtain a more desirable, equitable market 
outcome’ (European Commission 2009b: 2). The presence or otherwise of state aid is 
assessed within the meaning of article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and its compatibility 
determined under the stipulations of article 87(3). There are four cumulative conditions 
which have to be met for a measure to qualify as state aid: it must come from state resources; 
it must confer an economic advantage to the beneficiary/ies; it must be selective and 
distortive or potentially distortive of competition; and it must affect intra-Community trade 
(European Commission 2009b: 3). In investigations of state aid undertaken by the 
Commission in specific respect of article 87, state aid must be found to be well justified in 
terms of pursuit of social or economic development or as a rectifying measure for clear 
market failure. The measure in question must be proportionate to its objective/s and have a 
positive effect on welfare and competition (Papadias, Riedl and Westerhof, 2006: 14). It is 
also possible for the state to get involved in equity participation and capital injection into a 
company that might be involved in broadband deployment in our case, and the EU Court of 
Justice has ruled that direct or indirect activity of this nature is permissible as long as normal 
market conditions are found to pertain.  
Key indicators of abnormal market conditions, thus calling forth an aid compatibility 
assessment under article 87, would be situations where there was no medium to long term 
possibility of profitability from a venture and where private participants in a venture do not 
assume the same risk as public participants. This so called principle of the market economy 
private investor has been illustrated in the case of broadband in the Amsterdam decision 
(2007). It is also possible to consider the provision of broadband networks and services as 
services of general economic interest (SGEI) or public services as defined by article 86(2) of 
the EC Treaty. Here four so-called Altmark criteria must be met to ensure that the measure in 
question falls outside the scope of article 87 (1). These are: the recipient of state funding must 
be formally entrusted with the service, whose obligations must be clearly articulated; the 
means of calculating compensation for providing a SGEI must be established before the act 
and must be transparent and objective; the compensation must not be excessive; and, where 
not chosen through a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation must be 
determined through an analysis of the typical costs to a company of providing the service 
whilst ensuring a reasonable profit (European Commission 2009b: 5-6).  
A 1999 EU Council Regulation specifies a process of involvement of the Commission in the 
investigation of possible infringements of state aid rules by Member States (European 
Council of Ministers 1999).The Commission’s involvement in any case comprises two 
phases. In Phase 1, the Commission may decide that the measure under investigation does not 
constitute state aid. Alternatively, it may decide that the measure is aid but raises no doubts in 
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respect of it falling within article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. Finally, the Commission may 
decide to launch a more detailed investigation in the light of compatibility doubts raised by 
its initial appraisal of the measure. The compatibility assessment (also called the balancing 
test) is based on the stipulations of article 87(3) of the Treaty and may result in a number of 
decisions. The aim is to compare the positive impact of any state aid measure to realise an 
objective of common interest with any potential negative impact on trade and competition in 
the specified area that might ensue. A so-called positive decision is one where as a result of 
modifications undertaken by a Member State, initial doubts raised about a measure have been 
eradicated. Another possibility is a conditional decision wherein permission for a state aid 
measure is granted subject to Member State fulfilment of a number of conditions. If the 
Commission delivers a negative decision, thus finding an aid measure incompatible with the 
common market, this may have the condition of recovery attached to it, where the Member 
State is required, because of the illegality of the measure, to ensure the return of the aid given 
to the beneficiary (European Commission 2009).  
Between December 2003 and August 2009, the European Commission has made no fewer 
than 47 decisions in respect of state aid to broadband (European Commission Competition 
DG, 2009). Of the 22 decisions taken until 2006, the Commission adopted a negative 
conclusion in only one case2
In undertaking compatibility assessments in respect of article 87(3), the Commission has 
permitted broadband support measures which are considered to be aid to develop key 
economic activities or areas where the aid is judged not to adversely affect trading conditions 
contrary to the common interest. In undertaking its balancing test in respect of the broadband 
market, the Commission proposed the designation of three types of area reflective of the level 
of broadband deployment in existence prior to the measure under consideration having been 
deployed. Here, white areas have no broadband infrastructure with none likely to be 
developed in the near future. These areas are likely to qualify for state aid. By contrast, black 
areas are defined as those where at least two broadband networks exist and where services are 
provided competitively. In these areas, the Commission has argued that there unlikely to be 
evidence of market failure and thus any scope for state intervention. Third, so-called ‘grey’ 
areas are those with only one broadband operator in existence. This monopoly situation may 
allow state aid measures to be permitted under certain conditions, namely that no adequate 
services are offered to satisfy private or business customers and where it is proven that the 
state aid measure would be the least distortive of a range of measures  - not least regulation - 
available to rectify the situation.  
, though it is important to note that most of the projects which it 
has considered concern so called ‘white’ areas in which a population tends to be rurally 
located and sparse (see below). However, concern has been expressed by the Commission 
about the possible intervention of States in so called ‘black’ areas (Papadias, Riedl and 
Westerhof, 2006) which is indicative of the underlying neo-liberal  and potentially 
contradictory approach of the Commission (see below).  
In its 2009 Guidelines, the Commission stipulated in these cases a consideration of overall 
market conditions, network access conditions, barriers to market entry and the potential 
efficacy of regulatory measures as an alternative (PLC, 2009a). In particular, in respect of 
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designated white and grey areas, the Commission laid out a set of criteria to ensure that the 
level of state aid and any consequent distortive effects on competition have been minimised.  
 
RECENT EU POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS  - 
POLICY COHERENCE AND CONTRADICTIONS  
The development of the fixed link telecommunications network across Europe has taken the 
best part of a century to construct, a process which is arguably likely to be ongoing as long as 
electronic communication remains a cornerstone of human communication. In recent years, a 
key challenge has been to upgrade traditional copper based networks with fibre optic 
technology, providing the bandwidth capacity and speed of communication promised to users 
for almost 20 years. A key problem is that whilst much of the trunk telecommunications 
network has been upgraded, the vast and complex copper communications nexus between the 
user’s home or premises (or close thereto3) and nearest local switching centre has proven 
exceptionally time consuming and costly to refurbish. Thus the creation of this local, so-
called next generation access network (NGA) remains a major telecommunications policy 
goal across most of the EU. According to the European Commission (2009d: 13), ‘NGA 
networks are access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which 
are capable of delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics (such as 
higher throughput4
Whilst the use of state aid funding for the development of ‘traditional’ broadband networks 
has a fairly well established, if short, history in EU telecommunications policy (see above), 
the funding of NGNs through state aid has barely been considered and represents a 
potentially important landmark in the development of the EU’s approach to future electronic 
communications network environments. In its May 2009 draft Guidelines, the Commission 
highlighted the funding of so-called next generation access networks (NGAs) as a key matter. 
The initial tone was set by the EU Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, who noted that 
‘investments in this important infrastructure may both help economic recovery in the short 
term and allow long term benefits for European competitiveness’ (European Commission 
2009b: 1). Philip Lowe, also from the Competition Directorate, in a recent speech made the 
potentially significant assertion that it was likely that state aid would play a more significant 
role in the creation of NGAs than it had done in previous phases of broadband network roll-
out. Significantly, he noted that the Commission would consider sanctioning state aid where 
there is considered to be market failure, meaning inadequate private investment and 
inadequate coverage, even where the level in existence might be seen to satisfy some 
) as compared to those provided over existing copper networks’. In its 
revised September guidelines, however, the Commission defined NGAs rather sparingly, as 
consisting ‘wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of delivering 
broadband access services with enhanced characteristics’ (European Commission 2009: 19). 
The Commission noted that these networks would be able to support a converged future 
electronic communications service environment delivering high definition video and 
television content, as well as a range of high bandwidth audiovisual on-demand service 
applications. 
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economic goals. Specifically, the Commission would take into account equity and cohesion 
considerations where market forces may not produce socially desirable results.  
Unlike ‘traditional’ broadband networks, the economics of NGAs may militate against their 
deployment in urban areas as well as in rural areas with low density populations. The 
Commission has stated in its guidelines that in respect of NGAs ‘Member States may decide 
to invest themselves or provide financial support to private operators in order to obtain NGA 
network connectivity, or to obtain connectivity earlier than anticipated’ (European 
Commission 2009: 20).  The Commission has noted that, as in the case of state aid to 
broadband networks, the market economy investor principle, public service compensation 
and Altmark criteria also apply in the analysis of state aid to NGAs. It is important to note, 
however, that some of the work required in the deployment of NGAs can be undertaken by 
the state without it being considered as state aid. This refers to public or civil works such as 
digging and cable laying. However, this activity, if conducted by the state would need to of a 
non sector-specific nature and could provide facility to other types of utility providers. 
 In its assessment of state aid to NGAs, the Commission decided to continue to use as a 
definitional basis, a refined version of the so-called white, grey and black areas. Here, white 
NGA areas are defined as those where NGAs do not exist currently nor are likely to be 
created through market investment within the near future. NGA ‘grey’ areas are those where 
only one such network is currently in place or is likely to be deployed by the private sector in 
the near future. This area may be without basic broadband infrastructure beyond that 
available through the NGA or it may be an area in which one or more basic broadband 
providers are operational i.e. a traditional grey or back area (European Commission 2009a: 
22). In determining whether a particular measure is compatible, the Commission has stated 
that it will consider the effects of the proposed aid on existing broadband networks (given 
current levels of service substitutability) as well as the measures of the balancing test (see 
above). In respect of white NGAs where one basic broadband network already exists, states 
must demonstrate that broadband services already provided ‘are not sufficient to satisfy the 
needs of citizens and business users’ (European Commission 2009: 22) and that the intended 
goals cannot be achieved by other means, such as ex ante regulation. This appears a rather 
conservative vision of the development of new electronic communications services and 
stands in contrast to other more expansive rhetoric about the potential of new electronic 
communications networks and services in Europe’s future development, as well more 
immediately the role of  the communications sector as a dynamic driver of economic 
recovery at a time of severe recession.  
In respect of NGA grey areas, in a similar vein, the Commission concluded in its guidelines 
that for state aid for the purpose of creating another NGA to be sanctionable, the state would 
have to show that the existing or planned NGA network is insufficient to satisfy business and 
private user needs. This tightly circumscribed, modest perspective seems to contradict the 
aversion of neo-liberalism to the existence of network monopoly. The Commission further 
qualified this view by asserting that there may exist less distortive means to address user 
requirements than sanctioning state aid. This explicitly refers to the role of ex ante regulation 
and competition policy in ensuring attractive and effective access conditions under network 
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monopoly circumstances. Here, the Commission appears to be arguing that regulated 
monopoly is more favourable to state led efforts to create competitively based network 
competition.  
In the case of NGA black areas, the Commission has argued in its guidelines that any state 
aid to provide a new NGA network would have unacceptably distortive consequences on 
competition. However, in developmental terms, the Commission has focused on the process 
of migration of competitively ordered broadband black areas to NGA black areas. Here, it 
argued that there is potential for state intervention where broadband investors do not plan to 
invest in NGAs in the near future. Thus, states can demonstrate to the Commission that ‘the 
historical pattern of the investments made by the existing network investors…in upgrading 
their broadband infrastructures to provide higher speeds in response to users’ demands was 
not satisfactory’ (European Commission 2009: 23). In these cases, the compatability test 
would have to be undertaken. In addition, the beneficiaries of aid must make wholesale 
access to their network available to competitors for at least seven years, the access  conditions 
having been set in conjunction with the relevant communications NRA. On top of this, the 
NGA network architecture benefiting from state aid ‘should support effective and full 
unbundling’. The Commission’s preference here was expressed for ‘“multiple fibre” 
architecture’ which it considers to be a suitable vector to allow independence between parties 
requiring access as well as being supportive of point to point and point to multipoint 
technology’ (European Commission 2009a: 24). Though not stated explicitly the above 
requirements will also be applicable to NGA grey areas. This would seem to suggest that the 
Commission’s preference is for open access infrastructure. However, the extent to which state 
aid would be enough to make private companies invest in return for having to provide 
medium term open access is a moot point. The current economic climate would suggest that 
companies will have little immediate short term (i.e. within three year) plans for major 
investments so that state aid might be the best way of stimulating the perceived necessary 
move towards NGA deployment. However, the extent to which state coffers will be able to 
sustain significant funding of NGAs is open to question in the current economic climate, no 
matter how important and an useful investment in the future it might be. 
The final agreed guidelines, published in September 2009 (European Commission 2009a) 
contained an important modification of the Commission’s definition of what is the ‘near 
future’ in respect of the examination of the likelihood of infrastructural investment in NGAs 
in a given area. Originally defined as a five year period, in the final guidelines this was 
reduced to three years, suggesting a loosening of the criteria that might permit the granting of 
state aid. Beyond this, in respect of NGA white areas, should 3 year private sector investment 
plans be found to exist in a given area (thus pointing towards a negative decision in respect of 
the granting of any state aid), these plans would, nevertheless, have to be able to guarantee ‘at 
least significant progress in terms of coverage…within the three year period, with completion 
within a reasonable timeframe thereafter’ (PLC, 2009c: 5).   
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TOWARDS A FUTURE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
SERVICE ENVIRONMENT IN THE EU: THE DOMINATION OF REGULATED 
MARKET COMPETITION PERSPECTIVES  
Consideration of the extent to which EU policy on NGAs might sanction the role of state aid 
has in many ways been overshadowed and arguably (pre) determined by a simultaneous 
ongoing debate on the role that the EU’s now well established Electronic Communications 
Regulatory Framework should play in creating the conditions for NGA development to 
flourish. The development of EU telecommunications policy according to the neo-liberal 
parameters of harmonised, regulated competition since the mid 1980s has set a path in which 
the ‘default’ context for the NGA policy making is the use of regulated competition to 
achieve policy goals. It is also the case that the EU’s political powers stem very much from 
its legal-economic remit. This has conditioned EU thinking on social matters related to 
telecommunications policy to such an extent that, from its techno-economic perspective, the 
so-called ‘digital divide’ raises as many commercial-competitive issues as it does social 
equity issues. The underpinning expectation, articulated since the EU’s Bangemann Report 
(1993), has been that appropriately regulated and competitive communications markets will 
yield social goods. Within this context, only at the margins, where regulated competition has 
not developed, has direct state aid been countenanced. Even in these circumstances, state 
action is tightly circumscribed as not to be competition-distorting. 
In September 2008, the Commission launched a specific initiative to create an agreed 
regulatory strategy among Member States regarding NGA networks. Addressed to NRAs, a 
draft Recommendation dealt with a series of matters from common definition of next 
generation services to access conditions. Here, the principle of lowest level access was 
enunciated such that  regulators were encouraged to make mandatory the opening of access to 
competitors the ducts of incumbent network operators, so these competitors might install 
their own fibre. Beyond this, however, if deemed necessary to deal with a lack of 
competition, further higher level access arrangements could be created to stimulate 
competition, such as access to existing-but-unused fibre owned by the incumbent, as well as 
access to so-called ‘active’ elements, notably the bitstream capacity of the incumbent 
(European Commission 2008d). After a consultation, period, in June 2009, the Commission 
published  an updated version of its draft Recommendation. In this, it was stressed that the 
regulatory framework would be mostly asymmetric, that is, it would address incumbent 
operators’ market power. Though analysis of its fine detail goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is important to note that the draft Recommendation has been subject to criticism, not 
least from the European Telecommunications Network Operators, a collective body in which 
most telecommunications incumbents are members. ETNO argued that ‘the recommendation 
would lead to disproportionate regulation as…strictly cost based prices for regulated access 
products would make it almost impossible for operators to negotiate access conditions on 
reasonable terms and [would] undermine the NGA business case’ (EurActiv.com, 12 June 
2009). Given the high investment costs, the draft Recommendation endorsed the possibility 
of so-called co-investment schemes, not least in low population density areas. However, such 
co-investment schemes in order to be sanctioned, have to demonstrate their pro-competitive 
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nature and potential. In the draft Recommendation, no direct reference to the role that the 
state might play as a co-investor was made. 
The economics of NGA broadband infrastructures, like their fixed network predecessors, 
militate against a contestable market in competing infrastructure terms. The Commission 
itself has noted that as much as 80% of the total investment costs here are assigned to what it 
describes as civil works such that ‘in most cases…the deployment of parallel fibre networks 
is not viable because no ducts are available or because the population density is too low for a 
sustainable business model’ (European Commission 2009c: 2). In addition, opting to 
implement the neo-liberal model of regulation-mandated competition in the context of 
significant incumbent presence in a market faces the delicate task of creating enough 
incentive for the incumbent to invest in a context of regulated access requirements. The 
Commission has acknowledged that whilst the marginal costs to the incumbent of installing 
extra fibre in any act of investment are low relative to the gains that might be accrued from 
renting it to access seekers, there may be no incentive to do so should the access conditions 
be deemed too punitive by the incumbent (European Commission 2009d). At best, this might 
result in short to medium term delay in NGA rollout, or, at worst, a serious retardation of 
NGA development and damage to the EU’s competitive position in the long term. 
There are, however, alternatives to the Commission’s suggested optimal solution - put 
forward in its Recommendation on regulated access to NGAs - of ‘cost-oriented non-
discriminatory sharing of legacy physical infrastructure’ (European Commission 2009d). 
These might be pursued, at least in part, outside the parameters of the neo-liberal model of 
regulated competition. This policy option is brought into focus more sharply once the future 
electronic communications service context in which NGNs will be used is explored. It is here 
that the long heralded promises of ICT service convergence are likely to be fulfilled for users 
on a large scale. Thus, a range of audiovisual services, incorporating high definition 
television and interactive multimedia services will be available. The debate on precisely how 
to govern this new context is complex and has been ongoing at EU level for at least a decade, 
often controversially (see Michalis 1999). More recently in respect of state aid to the public 
service elements of audiovisual media , the EU has appeared to develop a policy from the 
same legal origins and underpinned by the same operational principles as its emerging state 
aid policy on broadband infrastructures. Here, neo-liberal concepts such as ‘transparency, 
proportionality, cost-efficiency, the market-investor principle and technological-neutrality’ 
(Donders and Pauwels 2008: 296) have dominated. Thus, the EU’s policy on role of the state 
in future electronic communications infrastructural and service contexts appears destined to 
set out a tight legal circumscription of the degree of future government involvement in the 
sector viewed through a market-based, competition-dominated lens. In this neo-liberal model 
state intervention is likely to be minimal, marginal and effected through a liberal-market 
modus operandi and policy goal structure. That this may not be the Commission’s intention, 
given the ambiguities in the recently articulated NGN policy explored in this paper, is a 
further cause for concern. 
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CONCLUSION  
EU telecommunications policy has for more than 20 years been underpinned by the goal of 
creating a system increasingly characterised by independent public regulation of across the 
board market-based competition. Here, the directly interventionist role of the state, whilst far 
from absent, has been exercised at the margins of the sector’s functioning and development. 
Recent policy activity of the European Commission aimed at setting harmonised conditions 
for the creation of NGA networks suggests a more expansive view of the role of the state in 
the infrastructural development of upgraded fixed link communications networks as a policy 
goal.  In fact, the Commission has argued that state aid to broadband ‘may also be viewed as 
a tool to achieve equity objectives…as well as freedom of expression to all actors in society’ 
(European Commission 2009b: 16).  
However, this paper has argued that this perspective is likely to remain largely rhetorical. The 
explanation lies in the fact that NGA network policy is ‘hide-bound’ within the practical 
constructs of the neo-liberal system which has characterised the last 20 years of 
telecommunications policy at EU level. Thus, the recent Commission proposals on state aid 
to NGA networks articulate any state aid involvement through the policy practices and goals 
of marketisation. Such activity should be marginal and even competition-promoting in nature. 
In tandem with this, related recent draft proposals on regulated access to NGA networks 
illustrate clearly the faith that regulated market capitalism will cater for future electronic 
network communications requirements. In a system where the pursuit of competition has 
been the end-goal in itself, however, this leaves the realisation of social benefits to vagaries 
of a market mechanism whose outcomes are often less than serendipitous in this respect. It is 
also the case that private sector network infrastructural roll out may not proceed at the pace 
desired by the Commission due to the current economic downturn, as well as disincentives to 
investment and access sharing for incumbent operators in fixed network infrastructure 
environments. The case of state aid NGA network policy at EU level illustrates the narrow 
economic-legal parameters of the acquis held by the latter – and thus the available degrees of 
freedom for policy manoeuvre -  in the communications sector. The alternative of  developing 
more powers regarding the social policy aspects of electronic communications at EU level is 
unlikely to occur due distinct Member State opposition. This was no more clearly illustrated 
than through the EU’s last major thwarted policy foray towards creating a common 
convergence regulatory framework for communications networks and services of a decade 
ago. 
 15 
REFERENCES 
Donders Karen and Caroline Pauwels (2008) ‘Does EU Policy Challenge the Digital Future 
of Public Service Broadcasting – An Analysis of the Commission’s State Aid Approach to 
Digitization and the Public Service Remit of Public Broadcasting Organizations’, 
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, 14(3), 
295-311. 
EurActiv.com (2009) ‘EC Recommendation on the Regulation of Next Generation Access 
Networks’ 12 June, http://pr.euractiv.com/print/press-release/ec-recommendation-regulation-
next-generation-access-networks-10055. 
European Commission (2008) Communications Committee Working Document: Broadband 
Access in the EU: Situation at 1 July 2008’, Brussels, 28 November, DG INSO/B3, 
COCOM08/B3. 
European Commission (2008) ‘Broadband: Commission Consults on Regulatory Strategy to 
Promote High Speed Next Generation Access Networks in Europe’ 18 September, 
IP/08/1370. 
European Commission (2009) ‘Commission Consults on Regulatory Strategy to Promote 
Very High Speed Internet in Europe’, 12 June, MEMO/09/274. 
European Commission (2009) ‘Draft Commission Recommendation of 12 June 2009 for 
Second Public Consultation on Regulated Access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA)’ Brussels, C(2009). 
European Commission (2009) ‘Community Guidelines for the Application of State Aid Rules 
in Relation to the Rapid Deployment of Broadband Networks’, 19 May. 
European Commission (2009) ‘Community Guidelines for the Application of State Aid Rules 
in Relation to the Rapid Deployment of Broadband Networks’, 2009/C 235/04. 30 
September. 
European Council (2009) ‘Key Issues Paper 2009 as Adopted by the Competitiveness 
Council on 5 March 2009. Annex: Responding Proactively to the Economic Downturn’, 
Brussels, 9 March, 7232/09, TB/FS/gf. 
European Parliament (2007) ‘European Parliament Resolution of 19 June on Building a 
European Policy on Broadband’ 19 June, Strasbourg, P6_TA(2007)0261, 2006/2273(INI). 
Goodman, Joseph (2006) Telecommunications Policy-making in the European Union, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Grande, Edgar (1994), ‘The new role of the state in telecommunications: an international 
comparison’, West European Politics, 17 (3), 138-58.  
 16 
Humphreys, Peter and Seamus Simpson (2005), Globalisation, Convergence and European 
Telecommunications, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1996), Regulating Europe, London and New York: Routledge. 
Michalis, Maria (1999), ‘European Union Broadcasting and Telecoms: Towards a 
Convergent Regulatory Regime?’, European Journal of Communication, 14 (2), 141–71. 
PLC (2009a) ‘Speech on State Aid for Broadband’, 3 July, http://uk.practicallaw.com 
PLC (2009b) ‘Commission Consults on Guidelines for the Application of the State Aid Rules 
to Public Funding of Broadband Networks’ 19 May, http://uk.practicallaw.com 
PLC (2009c) ‘Commission Adopts Guidelines for the Application of the State Aid Rules to 
Public Funding of Broadband Networks’, 17 September, http://uk.practicallaw.com 
Seidman, Harold and Robert Gilmour (1986), Politics, Position, and Power: From the 
Positive to the Regulatory State, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Papadadias, Lambros, Riedl, Alexander and Jan Gerrit Westerhof (2006) ‘Public Funding for 
Broadband Networks’ EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No3 Autumn, ISSN 1025-2266, 
13-18. 
Simpson Seamus (2009) ‘Supranationalism and its Limits in European Telecommunications 
Governance: the European Electronic Communications Markets Authority Initiative’, 
Information, Communication and Society, forthcoming. 
Thatcher, Mark (1999), The Politics of Telecommunications: National Institutions, 
Convergence, and Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
                                            
1 The ranges stretches from only 9.5% in Bulgaria to 37.4% in Denmark 
2 In respect of Dutch government support for the construction of a fibre glass network in the town of 
Appingedam.  
3 Fibre To The Home (FTTH) and Fibre To The Building (FTTB) in the case to direct access; Fibre To 
The Node (FTTN) or Fibre To The Cabinet (FTTC) in the case of what the Commission describes as 
‘an intermediary concentration point’ (European Commission 2009c:1). 
4 Optical fibre with downstream bandwidth of 40Mbps minimum and upstream bandwidth of 15 Mbps 
(current downstream speeds available from ADSL and ADSL2+ technologies are 8 and 24 Mbs 
maximum respectively; upgraded cable networks delivering speeds up to and above 50Mbps (current 
maximum speed is 20Mbps); connect newly built homes and offices with new fibre connections with 
100Mbs+ services – source European Commission 2009a: 14). 
